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THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARMY RESERVES:
A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

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for

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) → This research note outlines the ways that conventional military sociology does or does not apply to the active duty forces. Statistical data dreived from social background variables and attitude surveys reveal: that the Guard and the Reserves are more "top heavy" in grade distribution than the active force, and they are older; that the active force and Reserves are better educated than the Guard, and have more female and minority-group members; that prior-service ent-rants in the Guard and Reserves are much more likely to score high in mental		

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→ tests than non-prior service entrants, they are also better educated; dissatisfaction with service life is much higher in reserve forces than in the active force.

The data show that, rather than viewing the reservist as part of a moonlighting labor force, we must face the truth. Reserve duty conflicts with family concerns, and causes problems for reservists with their civilian employers, as they ask for released time to fulfill military requirements. These factors create major disincentives to joining the reserve forces.

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THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARMY RESERVES

A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Heretofore the sociology of the military has been, in effect, the sociology of active-duty forces. This report outlines the ways in which conventional military sociology applies or does not apply to the sociology of the reserves. The referent is the Selected Reserves of the U.S. Army, that is the National Guard and the Reserves. Two kinds of analyses are presented: tabular data contrasting reserve components with active-duty forces, and conceptual development of the sociology of the reserves.

Statistical data derived from social background variables and attitude surveys reveal the following. (1) The Guard and Reserves are more "top heavy" in grade distribution and older than the active force. (2) The active force and the Reserves compared to the Guard are higher educated, have higher minority content, and more females. (3) Prior service entrants in the Guard and the Reserves are much more likely to score higher in mental tests and be better educated than non-prior service entrants. (4) Dissatisfaction with service life is much higher in reserve forces than in the active force.

From a conceptual standpoint, the prevailing paradigm in manpower policy for reserve forces has been shaped by econometric

thought, most notably a theory of the reservist as part of a moonlighting labor market. Yet applications of moonlighting theory have found only a small relationship between primary-job characteristics and reserve recruitment and retention. Rather, data show the major disincentives arise from reserve-duty conflicts with familial priorities and with released time from the civilian employer.

Three key concepts are suggested to guide further research. (1) The prevailing occupational understanding of reserve forces needs to be counterbalanced by an institutional perspective. (2) Akin to the "dual market" model developed for active-force recruitment, the differences in social background of reserve entrants suggest non-prior service entrants join the reserves more for occupational reasons while prior service entrants seek an alternate dimension in their life style. (3) Because of the differences between part-time and full-time military service, normative commitment to the military organization requires more personal inner-direction in reserve forces than in the active-duty force.

The guiding assumption is that the researcher must be alert to differences as well as similarities between active and reserve forces. In brief, the sociology of the reserves is a subject that should be approached on its own terms.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARMY RESERVES:

A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

What is termed the sociology of the military is, in effect, the sociology of active-duty forces. Reserve forces have rarely been the object of conceptual analyses and, until very recently, of not much more empirical research. The underlying assumption of this report is that the sociology of the reserves is worthy of attention in its own right for both social scientific and policy reasons. The goal of this report is to begin defining the sociology (including social psychology) of the reserves by distinguishing it from the sociology of the active force. The first step toward this end is to show in what ways conventional military sociology applies or, more importantly, does not apply when looking at reserves. <1> Military manpower concerns often affect social scientific research. Thus, in the latter part of the 1970s, worries over recruitment in the all-volunteer force (AVF), especially in the Army, were evident. Correspondingly, the improved recruitment and retention of the AVF since 1981 reduced policy concerns with active-duty forces. Yet, the same period witnessing an upturn in manpower trends within active-duty forces has been accompanied by an upsurge of concern with reserve components. <2> But this has not corresponded with any major refocusing of military sociology toward reserve issues. Indeed,

it would not be too far afield to state that the sociology of reserve forces is unformed whether talking about conceptual, methodological, or empirical dimensions. This leads to the purpose of this report; to set forth forth a preliminary sociology of the reserves. The problematic is how much of social science wisdom developed out of research on active-duty forces applies to an understanding of the reserves.

This report deals with Selected Reserves in the U.S. Army. That is with the Army Reserves and the Army National Guard. When referring to these two components collectively, they will be termed reserve forces or reserve components. Also for convience of exposition, when distinctions are made made between the active-duty Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserves, the three components will be be termed, simply, Actives, Guard, and Reserves.

This report breaks new ground by offering a conceptual overview of reserve forces as more than just a variation of active-duty forces. This is done in two ways. First, I present tabular data that examines similarities and differences between active-duty forces and reserve forces. Second, I outline conceptual issues that distinguish between a sociology of active-duty forces and a sociology of reserve forces.

TABULAR DATA

The format is to present, based on available manpower

statistics, similarities and differences between Actives, the Guard, and Reserves in the U.S. Army. Nine tables are presented at the back of this report, each of which is discussed separately in the text here. For greater detail, the reader is advised to inspect each table separately. Unless otherwise specified, all the data deal with 1985 information. With the exception of Table 1, these tabular data have appeared nowhere else in the present format that directly compares active-duty with reserve forces. For purposes of clarity, numbers are rounded off to the nearest whole percent in the text discussion. A summary statement concludes this section.

Table 1: Active-Duty and Reserve Components by Military Service. Army personnel constitute a much greater portion (67 percent) of total reserve manpower than of the active force (36 percent). Thus, the sociology of the reserves is much more of an Army topic than the sociology of the active force.

Table 2: Distribution of Grade Groups by Army Components. The grade distribution varies between the three components. The Guard has the lowest proportion of senior officers and the highest proportion of junior officers. The Reserves have the largest proportion of senior officers and the lowest proportion of junior officers. The Actives fall in between the Reserves and Guard in the grade distribution of officers. At the enlisted levels, a somewhat different pattern of grade distribution appears. The Reserves have the highest proportion of senior NCOs

(E-7 and above) and junior enlisted (E-3 and below). The Guard has the lowest proportion of senior NCOs and the lowest number of junior enlisted. The Actives fall in between the two reserve components in the enlisted grade distribution.

The differential in grades between the three Army components is sometimes significant and sometimes marginal. But, the general pattern is for the grade distribution of the Guard to least resemble that of the the Actives while that of the Reserves most resembles that of the Actives.

Table 3: Age Distribution of Officers and Enlisted by Army Components. The age distribution between the Actives, Guard, and Reserves varies greatly. Thus, for example, 14 percent of Guard officers and 15 percent of Reserve officers are forty-seven years or older. This compares with with 6 percent of active-duty officers in the same age bracket. Whereas both reserve components have older officers than the active force, the pattern changes among younger officers. There are more young officers, twenty-six and under, in the Reserves (33 percent) than in either the Guard (14 percent) or Actives (15 percent).

At the enlisted level, the reserve forces are much older than the active force. Nine percent of the Guard and 8 percent of the Reserves are over forty-two years old compared with less than one percent of the Actives in the same age bracket. Correspondingly fewer younger enlisted men are found in the reserve forces compared to the active force.

Table 4: Years of Service of Major and Staff Sergeant by Army Components Two representative grades, major (O-4) and staff sergeant (E-6), are used to illustrate differences in years in service between the the three Army components. Seniority in years is most typical of the Guard, followed by the Reserves. Time in grade is least characteristic of the active force. Thus, the proportion of majors with at least 21 years of service is 91 percent for the Guard, 85 percent for the Reserves and 34 percent for the Actives. For staff sergeant, the corresponding figures are 12 percent for the Guard, 4 percent for the Reserves, and less than one percent for the Actives.

Table 5: Social Composition by Race and Sex of Army Components. Two major social background variables are presented in this table -- race and sex. The overall finding is that Actives and Reserves are more like each other with the Guard being the odd component. At the officer level, white males constitute 82 percent of the Actives and 81 percent of the Reserves, but 87 percent of the Guard. The demographic differences are sharpest at the enlisted levels. Thus, white males make up 57 percent of the Actives, 59 percent of the Reserves, but 81 percent of the Guard.

By sex, the important finding is that females make up a larger proportion in the Reserves (17 percent) than in either the Actives (10 percent) or Guard (8 percent).

Table 6: Percent of Accessions Female by Army Components.

Tables 6 through 9 present accession data that allow for a breakdown of Guard and Reserve statistics are into prior service (PS) and non-prior service (NPS) entrants.

The sex ratio information given in Table 5 is reinforced by an examination of 1985 accessions. The proportion of female entrants is highest in the Reserves (16 percent), closely followed by the Actives (13 percent), and lowest in the Guard (6 percent). Indeed, the female accession rate varies by a factor greater than three if we compare NPS entrants in the Reserves (18 percent) compared with PS entrants in the Guard (5 percent). For both reserve components, however, the proportion of NPS entrants who are female is somewhat greater than for PS entrants.

Table 7: Percent of Accessions by Educational Level of Army Components. When examining accession data by educational levels, a surrogate measure of socio-economic class, we observe major differences between and within the various Army components.

About one third of all NPS entrants into reserve components are recorded as still attending high school! This in turn confounds our comparison of accessions with a high school diploma because we do not know how many of the present high school attenders in the Guard or Reserves will become high school graduates.

At the other end of the educational scale, we can look at accessions with two or more years of college (reserve entry data does not categorize a higher educational level). Those with some

college make up a higher proportion of entrants for the Guard (11 percent) than for the Reserves or Actives (both 7 percent). But the difference between NPS and PS within the Guard and the Reserves is much greater than the difference between the Guard and Reserves or between either of the two reserve components and the active force. In broad terms, and perhaps somewhat counter intuitive, PS Guard and PS Reserve entrants are twice more likely to have some college than NPS Guard and NPS Reserve entrants.

Table 8: Percent of Male Accessions in Mental Test Categories I and II By Army Components. Again, differences between PS and NPS entrants within reserve components are more significant than those between the Actives, Guard, and Reserves. In general terms, there are no significant differences between Army components in the proportion of entrants falling in the top two mental test categories. But within reserve components, PS versus NPS differences are substantial. Thirty-eight percent of Guard PS entrants fall within categories I and II compared to 28 percent of NPS entrants. An almost identical pattern is found in the Reserves. Thus, as in the previous pattern noted for educational levels, we again find that PS Guard and PS Reserve entrants are more likely to represent higher quality youth than NPS Guard and NPS Reserve entrants.

Table 9: Reported Satisfaction with Active-Duty Army Service versus Service in Reserve Components, First-term Separates. This table reports one of the few attitudinal data

sets which allows for comparison between active and reserve forces. Based on the 1985 Army Experience Survey, recent separteers were much more likely to report greater satisfaction with their active-duty experience than with their reserve experience. <3> (No distinction was made in the survey item between Guard and Reserve membership.) Indeed, the number expressing "great dissatisfaction" with reserve duty is three times larger (22 percent) than that reported for the active-duty experience (7 percent.) We should keep in mind that this survey deals only with PS entrants into reserve forces, the population that generally displays higher quality than NPS entrants.

Summary. The working assumption that the sociology of the reserves differs from the sociology of the active force is a mite too simplistic. Even a cursory examination of available statistical data shows not only are there major empirical differences between the active and reserve forces, but also that equally important differences exist between the Guard and the Reserves. With regard to accessions, the even more striking finding is the differences between prior service and non-prior service entrants occurring within reserve components.

We can summarize the findings on the differences between the active force and reserve components and internal differences with reserve forces as follows:

- (1) The Guard and Reserves are more like each other compared to the Actives with regard to grade distribution and

years of service. (Guard and Reserves more "top heavy" and older.)

(2) The Actives and Reserves are more like each other compared to the Guard with regard to minority composition, educational level, and female accessions. (Actives and Reserves more black, higher educated, and more female.)

(3) PS Guard and PS Reserve entrants are more like each other compared with NPS entrants in the same Army component. (PS higher mental level and higher educated).

(4) Dissatisfaction with service life is much higher in reserve forces than in the active forces. (Data do not allow for differentiation of Guard versus Reserves.)

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Although the body of empirical data on reserve components is beginning to build up, conceptualization of the sociology of the reserves remains fragmentary and unfocused. <4> As with the active force, the prevailing paradigm in military manpower policy in the reserve forces has been shaped by econometric thought. Indeed, because of the near absence of countervailing approaches, the econometric model dominates reserve-force research even more than analyses of the active force.

In the early 1970s, the Air Force initiated a series of studies of reserve personnel which developed a theory of the reservist as part of a moonlighting labor market. <5> The

moonlighting theory holds that characteristics of the primary job -- essentially, wages and hours worked -- affect moonlighting decisions. The greater the earning and hours of the primary job, the less the likelihood of moonlighting (i.e. joining and staying in the reserves), and vice versa. Moonlighting theory, or, more formally, secondary labor market participation, has not only been the dominant paradigm in the study of manpower issues in the reserves, but has been the starting point for nearly all of sponsored research on reserve forces.

Yet all straight-forward applications of the moonlighting theory of occupational choice have found only a small relationship between primary-job characteristics and reserve recruitment and retention. <6> The general consensus in the econometric literature is that the "reserve reenlistment decision is more complex than the simple decision suggested by moonlighting labor theory and that certain assumptions inherent in moonlighting labor theory may hold only weakly for reservists." <7> Moreover, "reserve pay elasticity is much lower than similar elasticities measured for civilian moonlighting." <8>

Membership in a reserve units ought be distinguished from civilian moonlighting in several important ways. First, duty hours of reservists are quite different that of the typical moonlighting job. Second, reservists can be called into active duty in a national (or sometime local) emergency. Third, career

reservists receive important retirement benefits rarely found in civilian moonlighting employment. Fourth, reserve summer training conflicts with normal vacation time. <9> These factors bring into question the whole moonlighting concept of reserve forces. Studies are quite clear that the key variables, by far and away, in reserve retention are not directly related to financial costs and benefits of reserve duty. Survey data show that the major disincentives arise from reserve-duty conflicts with familial priorities and with released time from the civilian employer. <10>

That no systematic research exists on the interaction of reserve duty with family obligations points to major lacuna in the sociology of the reserves. This contrasts with major research enterprises focusing on the conflict between family needs and military demands in the active-duty force. Examination of conflict and accomodation within the family/reserve nexus will be undertaken by the present writer as one facet of the next stage in the research project. But as a preliminary statement, it may be more useful to think of reserve membership as closer to a voluntary association model than a moonlighting model.

In a related manner, the conflict between vacation time and summer training speaks directly to the reservist's relationship with his primary civilian employer. That federal government is one of the few employers allowing military reservists to take time off for both summer-duty reserve training and regular vacation

time allows for a kind of natural experiment. It is highly significant that federal employees make up 11.5 percent of the Selected Reserves and only 2.6 percent of the total labor force. <11> That this correlation has not been previously noted in the research literature speaks to the low level of development of the sociology of the reserves.

Sociological perspectives derived from the research on active-duty forces, nevertheless, may, with proper modification, advance our understanding of reserve forces. Three master hypotheses are suggested for further research: the first deals with conceptions of the military as an institution or an occupation, the second with the "dual-market" recruitment pool, and third with maintenance of normative commitment in a part-time organization. Each of these deserves separate attention.

An overarching hypothesis, largely inspired by my earlier research writings, proposes that with the advent of the all-volunteer force (AVF) the military began to adopt organizational patterns more and more resembling that of a civilian occupation while moving away from the traditional format associated with a military institution. <12> This is not the place to elaborate on that hypothesis nor on the debate it has caused in the research community. Suffice it to say, that an institution attains its basic legitimacy from normative values, while that of an occupation is shaped by the marketplace. Moonlighting theory would describe the reserves almost

exclusively in occupational terms. Yet, two studies of the reserves have explicitly stated that compared to active force, the reserves, if anything, are more institutional than occupational and a third has proposed that the reserves are even more institutional than the active force. <13> Evidence is not presently at hand to come to an definitive conclusion on this question, but, at the least, it suggests that the prevailing occupational understanding of reserve forces needs to be counterbalanced by an institutional perspective.

A second hypothesis, again in part derived from my earlier work, suggests that when recruiting an active-duty force, there are two basic markets. This "dual-market" model has become the operative scheme of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. On the one hand, there is the occupationally oriented recruit largely motivated by pay and security considerations, and prone to be interested in long enlistments and skill training. On the other hand, there is the young person looking for a hiatus in life before resuming formal education, a recruit attracted by short enlistments and post-service educational benefits. Patriotic motivations for entering military service cut across both groups.

There can be no mechanical application of the dual-market theory to reserve recruitment, but the following is proposed in light of the tabular findings that contrasted prior-service (PS) with non-prior service (NPS) reserve accessions. NPS accessions seem to fall closer to the economic man model while non-economic

motives are more likely to animate PS accessions. We find the social background of NPS reserve entrants resembles that of the occupational active-duty entrants while the PS reserve entrants come closer to those entrants seeking a new dimension in their life progression. One policy implication would be that educational benefits may be much more salient for PS than NPS entrants into the reserves.

The third hypothesis is that normative commitment varies in form, and perhaps in content, between a part-time military force and a full-time military service. Some work has been done on political values and socialization within the active force, but none on reserve components. <14>. I offer the argument that normative commitment in reserve forces requires more personal inner-direction. Put in another way, cohesion in a reserve unit is more a function of social background factors and individual attributes than is the case in active-duty units where cohesion is more determined by organizational structure.

From this perspective, we can look again at the observed high levels of dissatisfaction in reserve units. Rather than limiting ourselves to explaining the dissatisfaction as simply reflecting objective organizational differences between active and reserve components, we can now additionally examine to what degree dissatisfaction is caused by lack of reinforcement from other serving members. This perspective also allows us to conjecture that if circumstances result in high dissatisfaction

in active-duty units (say, as has been described during the Vietnam War or early AVF eras), the lack of negative attitudinal reinforcement could lead to (relatively) higher satisfaction in reserve units (which was probably the case during the late 1960s and much of the 1970s). Put in another way, the active force, because of the full-time nature of membership, has more of an echo chamber effect on attitude formation, whether favorable or unfavorable, toward military life.

CONCLUSION

This first report on the sociology of reserve forces has sought to demonstrate the sociology of the military has been, in effect, the sociology of the active-duty force. This is to say that the sociology of the military as generally understood can mislead as well as inform an understanding of reserve forces. The guiding assumption is that the researcher must be alert to differences as well as similarities between active and reserve forces. In brief, the sociology of the reserves is a subject that should be approached on its own terms.

Future reports in this project on the sociology of the reserves will focus on core issues in military effectiveness, organizational context, civil-military relations, and attitudes of serving members. The second report will present findings based upon participant observation in reserve units and in-depth interviews with reservists. The role of civilian technicians and

full-time Army personnel in reserve units will be given special attention. The third report will highlight organizational features in the American reserve system by making international comparisons with reserve forces of other Western nations. The final technical report will be based on the three earlier reports and specify the implications of the sociology of reserve forces for policy.

NOTES

1. Most of the writings on the military reserves have been historical accounts. For recent works and current bibliographies, see Bennie J. Wilson III, ed., The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985; John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1983; and Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citizen: A History of the U.S. Army Reserve, 1908-1983, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984). A comprehensive but now dated bibliography is Thomas C. Wyatt, "Sociology of the Military Reserves," unpublished paper, November, 1978.

For general works using a social science approach other than economic, see Louis A. Zurcher, Milton L. Boykin, and Hardy L. Merritt, Citizen-Sailors in a Changing Society, (Westport, Conn., 1986; Louis A. Zurcher and Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, eds., Supplementary Military Forces (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978); H. Wallace Sinaiko, "Part-Time Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen", report prepared for the Subcommittee on Non-Atomic Military Research and Development, Technical Cooperation Program, May, 1985; H. Wallace Sinaiko and Kenneth J. Coffey, "Reserve Manpower, Personnel and Training Research," proceedings of a workshop held at Monterey, Calif., June, 1986, issued by Manpower Research and Advisory Services, Sept., 1986.

Also relevant for the social scientist are Associates for

Research in Behavior, "A Study of Issues Related to Accessions and Retention of Enlisted Personnel in the Reserve Components," Nov., 1977; System Planning Corporation, "Condition of the Army Reserves -- 1980: Stability, Voluntarism, Effectiveness," December, 1980; Jeffrey K. Hadden, "Understanding the Reserves," unpublished paper, 1979; Lowndes F. Stephens, "Recruiting and Retaining the Citizen Soldier," Armed Forces and Society, 4, no. 1 (fall, 1977), pp. 29-39; and Zahava D. Doering and David W. Grissmer, "What We Know and How We Know It: A Selected Review of Research and Methods for Studying Active and Reserve Attrition/Retention in the U.S. Armed Forces, unpublished paper, 1986.

2. Letter to Secretary of Army, John Marsh, dated 9 March 1984 from Adjutants General Association of the United States; General Accounting Office, Personnel Problems May Hamper Army's Ready Reserve in Wartime (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Jan. 31, 1983); General Accounting Office, DoD [Total Force Management] -- Fact or Rhetoric? (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Jan. 24, 1979); Congressional Budget Office, Improving the Army Reserves (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November, 1985); Arthur L. Moxon, "U.S. Reserve Forces: The Achilles' Heel of the All-Volunteer Force?" in Wilson, ed., op. cit., pp. 91-113.

3. Westat, Inc., "The 1985 Army Experience Survey: Tabular Descriptions of First-Term Separates, Volumes I and II," Report

prepared for U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, January, 1986.

4. Among significant ongoing research on reserves is a large-scale survey of reserve members being conducted under the auspices of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the direction of Zahava D. Doering. These data will allow for direct comparisons with other survey data collected from active-duty service members. The results of this survey are expected to be ready for analysis in 1988.

5. Bernard Rostker, The Personnel Structure and Posture of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, R-1049-PR; Bernard Rostker and Robert Shisko, The Air Reserve Forces and the Economics of Secondary Labor Market Participation, R-1254-PR, August, 1973; and Bernard Rostker, Total Force, R-1430-PR, October, 1974 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation).

6. See, especially, William McNaught, Projecting Future Accssions to the Selected Reserve Components, N-1563-MRAL, August, 1980; William McNaught, The Supply of Enlistees to the Selected Reserve Forces N-1562-MRAL, July, 1981; David W. Grissmer, Zahava D. Doering, and Jane Sachar, The Design, Administration, and Evaluation of the 1978 Selected Reserve Reenlistment Bonus Test, R-2865-MRAL, July, 1982; David W. Grissmer and S.N. Kirby, Attrition During Training in the Army Reserve and National Guard N-2866-RA, August, 1984; David W. Grissmer and Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Attrition of Nonprior-Service

Grissmer and Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Attrition of Nonprior-Service Reservists in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve R-3627-RA, October, 1985 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation).

7. Burke K. Burright, David W. Grissmer, and Zahava D. Doering, A Model of Reenlistment Decisions of Army National Guardsmen R-2866-MRAL (Santa Monica, Calif.: October, 1982), p. vii.

8. John W. Brinkerhoff and David Grissmer, "The Reserve Forces in the All Volunteer Environment," in William Bowman, et al., eds., The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade (McLean, Va.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), p. 213.

9. Ibid., pp. 213-14.

10. David W. Grissmer and Sheila Nataraj Kirby, "Attrition and Retention in the Army Reserve and National Guard: An Empirical Analysis," in Curtis L. Golroy, ed., Army Manpower Economics Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, p. 183.

11. Ready Reservists in the Federal Government, annual report to the House Appropriations Committee concerning the Mobilization Availability of Ready Reservists Employed in the Federal Government, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), June, 1986.

12. For a synopsis of the thesis of military organization, see Charles C. Moskos, "Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update," Armed Forces and Society 12, no. 3 (Spring, 1986), pp. 377-382.

13. On the reserves as institution, see Gregory Candell, Charles L. Hulin, and Mary Roznowski, "Economic and Technological Influences on Reenlistment Intention," p. 159, and Louis A. Zurcher, Milton L. Boykin and Hardy L. Merritt, "Conclusion," p. 256 in Zurcher, Citizen Sailors, op. cit. For the argument that the reserves are more institutional than the active force, see Thomas C. Wyatt "The Reserves" paper presented at the International Conference on Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces, Colorado Springs, June, 1984.

14. See Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook, eds., The Political Education of Soldiers (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983).

Table 1. ACTIVE DUTY AND RESERVE COMPONENTS BY MILITARY SERVICE (FY1985)

Active Duty		Reserve Components	
Army	36.4%	Army National Guard	40.6%
		Army Reserves	26.8
		Total Army	67.4%
Navy	26.3	Navy Reserves	11.8
Air Force	28.1	Air National Guard	10.2
		Air Reserves	6.8
		Total Air Force	17.0
Marine Corps	9.2	Marine Corps Reserves	3.8
Total	<u>100.0%</u>		<u>100.0%</u>
AN	(2,147,845)		(1,058,337)

source: DoD statistics

Table 2. DISTRIBUTION OF GRADE GROUPS BY ARMY COMPONENTS (FY1985)

Grade Groups	Active Army	National Guard	Reserves
Officers:			
O6 and above	5.3%	4.3%	5.8%
O4-O5	34.2	26.6	40.7
O1 - O3	60.5	69.1	53.5
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(96,852)	(32,434)	(48,332)
Enlisted:			
E7-E9	10.5%	7.8%	11.6%
E5-E6	30.5	36.5	29.4
E4	28.6	28.0	24.9
E1-E3	30.4	27.7	34.1
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(671,285)	(388,287)	(230,708)

source: DoD statistics

Table 3. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED BY ARMY COMPONENTS
(FY1985)

Age Distribution	Active Army	National Guard	Reserves
Officers:			
47 or older	5.6%	14.0%	14.6%
37-46	32.3	36.1	34.4
32-36	23.6	22.2	28.2
27-31	23.7	13.0	13.4
26 or under	14.8	14.3	33.0
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(109,901)	(41,502)	(52,966)
Enlisted:			
47 or older	.7%	8.7%	7.8%
37-46	9.4	17.3	15.3
32-36	12.0	13.5	10.1
27-31	18.7	14.8	14.7
26 or under	59.1	48.2	49.9
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(671,285)	(388,287)	(230,710)

source: DoD statistics

Table 4. YEARS OF SERVICE OF MAJOR AND STAFF SERGEANT BY ARMY COMPONENTS
(FY1985)

Years of Service	Active Army	National Guard	Reserves
Major (O-5):			
21 or more	33.8%	90.5%	84.8%
15-20	60.6	6.6	9.0
11-14	2.7	1.9	2.4
7-10	2.0	.4	1.4
4-6	.3	.3	1.2
0-3	.5	.2	1.2
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(17,003)	(5,887)	(13,348)
Staff Sergeant (E-6)			
21 or more	.5%	11.6%	4.0%
15-20	18.2	39.8	32.0
11-14	39.3	28.3	32.1
7-10	38.6	16.4	25.4
4-6	1.7	3.7	4.9
0-3	1.6	2.2	1.6
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(87,381)	(54,004)	(27,584)

source: DoD statistics

Table 5. SOCIAL COMPOSITION BY RACE AND SEX OF ARMY COMPONENTS (FY1985)

Social Category	Active Army	National Guard	Reserves
Officers:			
White Male	81.6%	86.7%	80.6%
Black Male	8.1	2.1	5.7
Other Male	.5	3.0	1.8
White Female	8.1	6.9	9.6
Black Female	1.7	1.0	1.8
Other Female	--	.3	.5
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(109,901)	(41,502)	(52,966)
Enlisted:			
White Male	57.2%	80.6%	58.6%
Black Male	25.5	7.0	19.5
Other Male	7.1	4.1	6.2
White Female	5.2	6.4	10.0
Black Female	4.4	1.4	4.7
Other Female	.6	.5	1.0
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(666,149)	(388,287)	(230,657)

Source: DoD statistics

Table 6. PERCENT OF ACCESSIONS FEMALE BY ARMY COMPONENTS (FY1985)

Active Army	12.9
Army National Guard Total	5.6
ANG Non-Prior Service	6.3
ANG Prior Service	5.0
U.S. Army Reserves Total	16.3
USAR Non-Prior Service	18.0
USAR Prior Service	15.0

source: DOD statistics

Table 7. PERCENT OF ACCESSIONS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF ARMY COMPONENTS
(FY1985)

Component	Attending High School	High School Diploma Graduate	Two Or More Years College
Active Army	--	90.7	6.5
Army National Guard Total	16.2	58.6	10.6
ANG Non-Prior Service	33.3	40.9	7.2
ANG Prior Service	.5	74.8	13.6
US Army Reserves Total	18.7	48.8	7.2
USAR Non-Prior Service	35.7	43.8	4.6
USAR Prior Service	1.8	67.9	9.8

source: DOD statistics

Table 8. PERCENT OF MALE ACCESSIONS IN MENTAL TEST CATEGORIES I AND II BY
ARMY COMPONENTS (FY1985)

Active Army	35.1
Army National Guard Total	33.1
ANG Non-Prior Service	27.8
ANG Prior Service	38.1
US Army Reserves Total	32.9
USAR Non-Prior Service	29.6
USAR Prior Service	37.6

source: DoD statistics

Table 9. REPORTED SATISFACTION WITH ACTIVE-DUTY ARMY SERVICE VERSUS SERVICE IN RESERVE COMPONENTS, FIRST-TERM SEPARATEES (1985)

	Active Duty	Reserve Components
Very Satisfied	25.4%	19.4%
Satisfied	51.2	39.1
Dissatisfied	16.5	19.5
Very Dissatisfied	6.9	22.0
Total	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(2,543)	(1,008)

Source: U.S. Army Research Institute, The 1985 Army Experience Survey: Tabular Descriptions of First-Term Separatees.